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ARGUMENT 
I. THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE 
TO AWARD MS. KRANENDONK HER LITIGATION EXPENSES. 
In her opening brief, Ms. Kranendonk de1nonstrated (1) that litigation 
expenses are recoverable for an attorney's breach of fiduciary duty where the 
attorney's conduct in litigation is largely responsible for the1n and (2) that 
Defendants' litigation conduct is largely responsible for her expenses. (Br. of 
Appellee and Cross-Appellant ("Br. of Cross-Appellant") 62-65.) In response, 
~ Defendants do not dispute that their litigation conduct is largely responsible for 
Ms. Kranendonk's litigation expenses. (See Reply Br. of Appellants and Br. of 
Cross-Appellees ("Br. of Cross-Appellees") 34-38.) 
They still contend, however, that Ms. Kranendonk should not be awarded 
her reasonable and necessary litigation expenses. Their argu1nent rests, first, on 
the assertion that "Ms. Kranendonk has not provided any rationale for extending 
the ... award of litigation expenses in Campbell to all cases involving a breach of 
fiduciary duty." (Id. at 36.) Second, Defendants contend (1) that, in any event, the 
trial court already awarded Ms. Kranendonk her reasonable and necessary 
expenses and (2) that an award of "litigation expenses" under Campbell is subject 
to the same statutory constraints as an award of "costs" is under rule 54( d) of the 
..,;J Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (Id. at 37-39.) Defendants are 1nistaken on all 
counts. 
1 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
A. Ms. Kranendonk has provided a compelling rationale for 
awarding litigation expenses for an attorney's breach of 
fiduciary duty. 
In Campbell v. State Fann Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 2001 UT 89, 65 
P.3d 1134, rev' don other grounds, 538 U.S. 408 (2003), this Court recognized "that 
breach of a fiduciary obligation is a well-established exception to the A1nerican 
rule precluding attorney fees in tort cases generally" and awarded fees against 
an insurer who breached its fiduciary duty. Id. ,r 122. The Court then said: "For 
the same reasons detailed in the ... section regarding attorney fees, we conclude 
that litigation expenses are [also] recoverable in this lhnited type of action[.]" Id. 
,r 127. By "this limited type of action," the Court plainly meant actions where an 
insurer breaches its fiduciary duty to its insured and then engages in "litigation 
conduct [that is] largely responsible for [the insured's litigation expenses]." 1 See 
1 In her opening brief, Ms. Kranendonk quoted Campbell's holding regarding 
litigation expenses as follows: '"[O]ur determination [is] that litigation expenses 
may be awarded in [insurer breach of fiduciary duty cases] in which the 
defendant's litigation conduct has been largely responsible for them."' (Br. of 
Cross-Appellant 62 (quoting Campbell, 2001 UT 89, ,r 127, 65 P.3d 1134).) 
Defendants note that, without alteration, the foregoing quotation reads: "'[O]ur 
determination [is] that litigation expenses may be awarded in bad faith insurance 
cases"'; and they now assert that "[t]he language of Campbell does not support 
Ms. Kranendonk's generous alteration" of that quotation. (Brief of Cross-
Appellees 36 n.11 (quoting Campbell, 2001 UT 89, ,r 127, 65 P.3d 1134 (emphasis 
added)).) Defendants are again mistaken. Campbell involved third-party 
insurance bad faith. See 2001 UT 89, 'jf,1120-22, 65 P.3d 1134. In the third-party 
insurance context, an insurer acts in bad faith when it breaches its fiduciary duty. 
See id.; Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 701 P.2d 795, 799-800 (Utah 1985). Thus, 
when Campbell says that "litigation expenses may be awarded in bad faith 
2 
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id. In short, this Court concluded that if attorney fees are awardable for breach of 
fiduciary duty, so are litigation expenses, and for the same reasons. See id. 
The Court then restated those reasons as follows: 
For the sa1ne reasons detailed in the ... section regarding attorney 
fees, we conclude that litigation expenses are recoverable in this 
limited type of action; their availability will: (1) decrease incentives 
for insurers to act in bad faith; (2) encourage insurers to act 
reasonably; and (3) contribute to actual compensation for plaintiffs 
for financial cost to them of the breach. 
Id. Then the Court observed that the insurer's defense in that case had been 
"'labored, vexatious and burdensome'" and that the insurer '"knew or should 
have known that its oppressive defense ... would be extre1nely costly to 
~ plaintiffs."' Id. Finally, the Court noted that the foregoing" observations 
underscore[ d] the policy reasons supporting [its] detennination that litigation 
expenses may be awarded in insurance [breach of fiduciary duty] cases in which 
the defendant's litigation conduct has been largely responsible for them." Id. 
The Court's rationale in Campbell for allowing an award of litigation 
expenses against an insurer for breach of fiduciary duty is equally applicable 
here because allowing an award of litigation expenses against an attorney for 
breach of fiduciary duty will (1) decrease incentives for attorneys to breach their 
insurance cases," it is saying exactly that litigation expenses may be awarded in 
insurer breach of fiduciary duty cases. Ms. Kranendonk' s replacement of the 
phrase "bad faith insurance cases" with the phrase "insurer breach of fiduciary 
duty cases" is, therefore, not a" generous alteration," as the Swapp Firm claims. 
Instead, it is a precise restatement of Campbell's holding. 
3 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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fiduciary duties, (2) encourage attorneys to act reasonably, especially when they 
discover they have made 1nistakes, and (3) contribute to actual compensation for 
clients for the financial cost caused by their attorney's breach of duty. 
Moreover, just as the Campbell insurer's burdensome defense underscored 
the policy reasons supporting an award of litigation expenses for an insurer's 
breach of fiduciary duty, Defendants' burdensome defense here likewise 
underscores the reasons supporting an extension of the Campbell holding to cases 
of attorney breach of fiduciary duty.2 
Concededly, Ms. Kranendonk did not unfold in her opening brief the 
foregoing rationale to the extent that she has here. But she relied on it by 
reference when she cited the Court's conclusion in Campbell that if fees are 
awardable for breach of fiduciary duty, then, for the same reasons, expenses are 
recoverable as well, and then said: "Likewise here, for the sa1ne reasons detailed 
above regarding attorney fees, the Court should conclude that litigation expenses 
are recoverable for an attorney's willful breach of fiduciary duty where the 
2 Because expenses are not recoverable under Campbell unless the fiduciary's 
litigation conduct was largely responsible for them-i.e., the fiduciary's litigation 
conduct was knowingly burdensome-the holding sought here would not result 
in expenses being recoverable in nearly every breach of fiduciary duty case as 
Defendants' suggest (see Br. of Cross-Appellees 36). It would, however, mean 
that they are recoverable here since Defendants have tacitly conceded that they 
knew or should have known that their litigation conduct was largely responsible 
for Ms. Kranendonk' s expenses. 
4 
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attorney's litigation conduct is largely responsible for those expenses." (Br. of 
Cross-Appellant 62.) Based on the cmnpelling rationale articulated by the Court 
in Campbell, relied on by reference in Ms. Kranendonk's opening brief, and 
unfolded more fully here, the Court should extend Campbell's holding regarding 
litigation expenses and conclude that litigation expenses are recoverable for an 
~ attorney's breach of fiduciary duty when the attorney's litigation conduct has 
been largely responsible for them. 
B. Defendants conflate II costs" under rule 54( d) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure with reasonable and necessary "litigation 
expenses" under Campbell, resulting in arguments that are 
unsupported by the law. 
1. Defendants are mistaken when they asse1"t that the frial court 
afready determined which of Ms. Kranendonk's litigation 
expenses were reasonable and necessa1y. 
Defendants argue that, even if litigation expenses are awardable here, "Ms. 
Kranendonk has not attempted to show - and cannot show - that the district 
court abused its discretion in awarding [only] $17,911.82 in litigation expenses." 
(Br. of Cross-Appellees 37.) hnplicit in Defendants' foregoing state1nent is the 
assertion that the trial court already awarded Ms. Kranendonk her litigation 
expenses and determined which of them were reasonable and necessary. (See id.) 
Defendants' assertion mistakenly conflates "costs" with "litigation expenses." 
~ The trial court expressly distinguished between "costs" and '''litigation expenses" 
and then declined to award "litigation expenses," as the trial court explained: 
5 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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"There is a distinction to be understood betvveen the legiti111ate and 
taxable 'costs' and other 'expenses,' of litigation which may be ever 
so necessary, but are not properly taxable as costs." 
(R. 7700 (citation omitted).) 
[Ms. Kranendonk] argues that all costs-including litigation 
expenses - should be awarded as consequential damages in 
accordance with Campbell .... However ... , the Court declines to 
extend Campbell to encompass the breach of fiduciary duty 
established herein and awards only those costs properly taxable in 
accordance with rule 54. 
(R. 7700 n.3.) As the trial court understood, an award of "costs" under rule 54( d) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is different fro1n Campbell's award of 
"litigation expenses." See Stevensen 3rd East, LC v. Watts, 2009 UT App 137, ,r 62, 
210 P.3d 977 (citations omitted). "Costs are defined as 'those fees which are 
required to be paid to the court and to witnesses, and ... which the statutes 
authorize to be included in the judgment."' Id. ,I 63 (citation 01nitted). "Costs" 
may not include expenses for "trial exhibits, photographs, and certified copies of 
docmnents, ... photocopying costs, ... and ... ' [ a ]ny amount paid over [a] 
statutory allowance' for witnesses, travel, or service of process fees." Id. ( citations 
omitted). Furthermore, the amount of" costs" that are awardable is limited to the 
amounts in "'the fee schedule set by statute."' Id. (citation omitted). 
6 
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On the other hand, "litigation expenses," such as full expert witness fees, 
litigation travel expenses, trial exhibits, etc., are allowed under the Campbell rule 
that Ms. Kranendonk asks the Court to apply here. See Campbell, 2001 UT 89, ilil 
12, 127, 65 P.3d 1134 (affirming award of "$400,747.78 for litigation expenses"). 
Because "costs" and "litigation expenses" are different and the trial court 
~ expressly did not award Ms. Kranendonk litigation expenses, the trial court has 
not already determined which of her expenses were reasonable and necessa1y. 
Thus, there is no determination of reasonable and necessary litigation expenses 
for this Court to review for an abuse of discretion as Defendants suggest. 
(@ 
Rather, there is only the legal question of whether litigation expenses are 
recoverable for an attorney's breach of fiduciary duty. See id. ,r 127. The Court 
should hold that they are when the attorney's litigation conduct is largely 
responsible for them, see id., and then re1nand for the trial court to determine in 
the first instance which of Ms. Kranendonk' s litigation expenses were reasonable 
I@ and necessary, cf State in Interest of A.R., 937 P.2d 1037, 1041 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) 
(stating in a Fourth Amendment context that '"[r]easonableness is in the first 
<@ instance for the [trial court] to determine'"). 
7 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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2. Defendants are mistaken when they assei-t that the 
measure of 1·easonable and necessa1-y -"litigation 
expenses" undei- Ca1npbell is subject to the same 
statuto1-y const1·aints as ai-e "costs" under rule 54(d). 
Defendants' last argument with regard to litigation expenses is that, even 
if litigation expenses are recoverable for an attorney's breach of fiduciary duty 
where the attorney's litigation conduct is largely responsible for the expenses, 
such an award "must ... be limited to the expenses recoverable under rule 54(d) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." (Br. of Cross-Appellees 37.) This argument 
is at odds with Campbell and, if adopted, would render an award of "litigation 
expenses" meaningless. 
Defendants' argument is at odds with Campbell because the Court said 
there "that the appropriate 1neasure for awarding litigation expenses is whether 
such expenses are reasonable and necessary," 2001 UT 89, ,r 128, 65 P.3d 1134, 
and made no 1nention of the statutory limits placed on cost awards under rule 
54(d). See id. ,r,r 126-30. The statutory lilnits applied to costs awards under rule 
54(d) allow for recovery of only filing fees, service of process fees, statutory 
witness fees, and essential deposition costs, see Morgan v. Morgan, 795 P.2d 684, 
686-87 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), yet the Campbell plaintiffs were awarded over 
$400,000 in litigation expenses, 2001 UT 89, ,I 12, 65 P.3d 1134, an amount plainly 
not constrained by the statutory lilnits applicable under rule 54( d). 
8 
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Finally, Defendants' argu1nent, if adopted, would render an award of 
"litigation expenses" meaningless since such an award would equate to the 
award of "costs" that a prevailing party already is entitled to in 1nost cases. See 
Utah R. Civ. P. 54( d). As noted above, the purpose of an award of litigation 
expenses for an attorney's breach of fiduciary duty would be to (1) decrease 
~ attorneys' incentives to breach their fiduciary duties, (2) encourage attorneys to 
act reasonably, especially when they discover they have made mistakes, and (3) 
contribute to actual cmnpensation for clients for the financial cost caused by their 
attorney's breach of duty. None of these purposes would be served if "litigation 
expenses" were interpreted to be the sa1ne as the "costs" already "allowed as of 
course to the prevailing party." Utah R. Civ. P. 54( d). 
For their argument, Defendants rely on Armed Forces Insurance Exchange v. 
Harrison, 2003 UT 14, 70 P.3d 35, and Stevenson 3rd East, LC v. Watts, 2009 UT 
App 137,210 P.3d 977. (Br. of Cross-Appellees 37-38.) However, these cases are 
I@ inapplicable here. In Stevenson 3rd, "[t]he trial court ruled ... that [the plaintiff's] 
litigation expenses, namely, [its] expert witness fees and photocopying costs, 
~ were recoverable as consequential damages." 2009 UT App 137, ,r 23, 210 P.3d 
977. The Court of Appeals disagreed. See id. ,r,r 62-68. The Court of Appeals 
noted the difference between u costs" and "litigation expenses" and then 
observed that, while '"costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party 
9 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
unless the court directs otherwise,"' id. ,r,r 62-63 (quotiJ.1.g Utah R. Civ. P. 54(d)), 
"[c]osts and litigation expenses are awardable as consequential da1nages only in 
limited circu1nstances," id. ,I 66 ( e1nphasis added). It then held that Stevenson 3rd 
did not present one of those limited circumstances. See id. For that reason, the 
Court of Appeals overturned the trial court's award of full expert witness fees 
and photocopying expenses as litigation expenses. Id. ,I 68. If this Court extends 
Campbell, as urged, and determines that an attorney's breach of fiduciary duty is 
among the limited circumstances where litigation expenses are recoverable, then 
Stevenson 3rd is plainly inapplicable. 
In Armed Forces, this Court addressed in dicta3 the recoverability of 
reasonable and necessary expert witness fees as consequential damages of fraud. 
See 2003 UT 14, ,r,r 38-43, 70 P.3d 35. The Court in Armed Forces acknowledged 
that in Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1980), it held that in fraud cases "'"the 
defrauded party 1nay recover any additional damages which are a natural and 
3 Dicta is that portion of a court's opinion that is "not necessary to the decision of 
that case." In re Clark's Estate, 354 P.2d 112, 115 (Utah 1960). The part of Armed 
Services that Defendants rely on is the portion addressing the awardability of 
"expert fees ... sought as an 'element of fraud-based damages."' (Br. of Cross-
Appellees 37-38 (citing Armed Forces, 2003 UT 14, ,r,r 41-43, 70 P.3d 35).) Because 
the Court said in Armed Forces that it "need not reach" the issue of the award-
ability of expert fees as an element of fraud-based damages, 2003 UT 14, ,r,r 38, 
41-43, 70 P.3d 35, the portion of that case relied on by Defendants is dicta, see In 
re Clark's Estate, 354 P.2d at 115. "[T]his [C]ourt is not bound by earlier 
dicta."State v. Gardiner, 814 P.2d 568,572 (Utah 1991). 
10 
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proxhnate consequence of the defendant's misrepresentations."'" Armed Forces, 
2003 UT 14, 'if 43, 70 P.3d 35 (quoting Dugan, 615 P.2d at 1250). Yet the Court then 
instructed the Armed Forces trial court on remand to limit the amount of expert 
witness fees it awarded in that fraud case to the a1nount allowed for wih1ess fees 
under rule 54( d), saying: "No Utah statute provides for extra compensation to 
(0) expert witnesses in fraud cases. In Young we 1nade it clear that 'even if necessary, 
fees paid over the amount allowed by statute are not properly taxable as costs, 
and are therefore not recoverable." Id. ( quoting Young v. State, 2000 UT 91, 'jJ 16, 
16 P.3d 549). 
The Court's Armed Forces dicta apparently states the view that, 
notwithstanding the holding in Dugan that" any" consequential damages are 
recoverable in fraud cases, litigation expenses (like full expert witness fees) are 
not-i.e., that fraud is not one of the limited circumstances where litigation 
expenses are recoverable as consequential damages. This reading is supported by 
~ the fact that to support its dicta Armed Forces cites only cases that treat expert 
witness fees as "costs" under rule 54(d). See id. (citing Young, 2000 UT 91, 'if'if 14-
(J) 16, 16 P.3d 549 (distinguishing "'costs' and other 'expenses,' of litigation, which 
may be ever so necessary, but are not properly taxable as costs" and holding that 
it was error to award an expert wih1.ess fee "as a cost"); Frampton v. Wilson, 605 
P.2d 771,774 (Utah 1980) (same); Morgan, 795 P.2d at 686-87 (same)). The Armed 
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Forces opinion cites no case where full expert wih1ess fees or other "litigation 
expenses" were awarded but then capped at the statutory lhnits applicable to 
"costs" under rule 54(d). See id. 
If Armed Forces is read as just explained- i.e., as expressing the opinion 
that fraud is not one of the limited circumstances where litigation expenses are 
recoverable as consequential damages-it is inapplicable here since this is a 
breach of fiduciary duty case wherein Ms. Kranendonk relies on Campbell for an 
award of litigation expenses, not a fraud case wherein the plaintiff relies on 
Dugan for an award of litigation expenses. 
Defendants assert that Armed Forces must be read as holding that awards 
of "litigation expenses" are capped at the statutory limits applicable to awards of 
"costs" under rule 54(d). (Br. of Cross-Appellees 37-38.) Defendants' reading of 
Armed Forces should be rejected because (1) it treats the dicta therein as a holding; 
(2) it would result in awards of "litigation expenses" and awards of "costs" being 
equal, which (as noted above) would undermine the purposes behind an award 
of litigation expenses; and (3) it is at odds with the opinion's treahnent of the 
expert witness fees requested therein as" costs" rather than as" expenses" (as 
also noted above). 
12 
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II. THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE TRIAL COURT'S EXCLUSION 
OF THE EVIDENCE THAT HIGHBERG CALLED MS. KRANENDONK 
A "MORON" AND A "PAIN IN THE ASS." 
A. The trial court erroneously based its rule 403 analysis on a 
determination that Highberg' s "moron" and "pain in the ass" 
comments were not relevant. 
In her opening brief, Ms. Kranendonk first argued, with regard to the 
exclusion of Highberg's "1noron" and "pain in the ass" c01n1nents, that the trial 
court's exclusion of those c01nrnents amounted to an erroneous relevancy 
detennination, not a rule 403 analysis. (Br. of Cross-Appellant 67.) Defendants 
disagree (Br. of Cross-Appellees 44-46), but they are mistaken. 
During oral argument at trial, Ms. Kranendonk' s counsel observed that for 
Ms. Kranendonk to prove her punitive damages claim, she had to show that 
Highberg acted with a "1nalicious, willful, wanton or reckless" 1notive when he 
(.&) deceived her. (R. 8778.) Counsel then observed that "the impression that the Jury 
[had] been left with" by Highberg's testi1nony was that he was "the night in 
shining armor who loved his client and was driven by the magnanimous intent 
to protect her from all the stress and worry that would be caused ... by ... 
telling her the truth." (R. 8779.) Thus, counsel argued, Highberg had opened the 
door to evidence that he actually "harbor[ed] ill will toward Ms. Kranendonk," 
i.e., that he considered her a "pain in the ass" and "moron" (R. 8780), and the 
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issue was now whether "the probative value [of that evidence] outvveighs the 
prejudice" (R. 8782). 
The trial court responded as follows: 
I'1n anticipating that [defense counsel] is going to argue something 
like when Mr. Highberg made these state1nents in his needle notes 
about how he ... thought of her as a pain in the rear or that she was 
a moron would suggest frustration, but it hardly suggests that he was 
acting against her interest intentionally . 
. . . He may have cared deeply about her. He 1nay have been very 
interested in prosecuting her case ... and the fact that he got a little 
irritated with her from time to thne because she persisted in asking 
the same question over and over and that sort of thing, that is not 
directly on point. That doesn't suggest that he didn't care about her . ... 
(R. 8783-84 (emphasis added).) 
In response, Ms. Kranendonk' s counsel stated: 
... [T]hat's an inference for the Jury to draw. I mean that's what they 
have to do and reasonable inferences they're allowed to draw from 
the evidence. [Highberg' s "moron" and "pain in the ass" comments 
are] one of the best points of evidence we have if not the only point 
we have about his state of 1nind about Jodi Kranendonk .... [T]he 
inference that could be drawn is that he didn't tell her because he 
didn't care about her. He thought she was a pain in the ass. Thought 
she was a moron[.] [A]nd you know what? I'm not going to tell her 
[about 1nissing the statute of limitations] until later[.] 
(R. 8784.) h1 the end, however, the trial court excluded Highberg's "moron" and 
"pain in the ass" comments based on this conclusion: "[I]t just appears that he 
was making a note to himself to suggest that there were times she was a little 
irritating and he was getting a little impatient in s01ne ways." (R. 8788.) 
14 
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To say that Highberg's c01n1nents "[did]n't suggest that he did not care 
about Ms. Kranendonk," were "not directly on point," and "hardly suggest[] that 
he was acting against her interest intentionally"; and to then conclude that" it 
just appears that he was making a note to hilnself to suggest that there were 
times she was a little irritating and he was getting a little hnpatient in some 
~ ways" is to say that Highberg' s cormnents had no tendency to make it more 
probable that Highberg had ill motives when he deceived Ms. Kranendonk. In 
short, the trial court based its rule 403 ruling on a relevancy detennination. See 
Utah R. Evid. 401 ( defining relevant evidence as that which "has any tendency to 
1nake a fact 1nore or less probable").4 
In State v. Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, 973 P.2d 404, this Court noted "the cormnon 
misconception that rule 403 is a relevancy rule" and held that when a trial court 
bases a rule 403 analysis on "relevancy" instead of "policy," that "constitute[s] 
4 Defendants essentially concede this point when they also say that "[t]he [trial] 
court determined that the excluded comments did not connect the frustration Mr. 
Highberg experienced ... with his failing to tell her promptly of the missed filing 
deadline." (Br. of Cross-Appellees 48.) 
Alternatively, the trial court weighed the c01npeting inferences that could 
be drawn from Highberg's "moron" and "pain in the ass" cormnents and 
decided that one inference was more credible than the other. (See R. 8788.) 
However, because the weighing of inferences is the jury's task, State v. Jones, 2016 
UT 4, ,r 24,365 P.3d 1212 ("Weighing evidence in search of the most reasonable 
inference to be drawn therefrom is the role of the factfinder at trial."), even under 
this interpretation of the trial court's analysis, the trial court erred by weighing 
inferences instead of weighing probative value against the danger of unfair 
prejudice. 
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error." Id. ,I 21. Thus, by basing its rule 403 analysis on relevancy instead of 
policy, the trial court here erred. See id. Accordingly, this Court should re1nand 
for retrial of the punitive damages issue and give guidance, in light of Sections C 
and D below, to aid the trial court in making a proper rule 403 analysis of the 
admissibility of Highberg's "1noron" and "pain in the ass" conunents. See State v. 
Low, 2008 UT 58, ,r 61, 192 P.3d 867 (stating that the Court has discretion to 
address "issues presented on appeal that will likely arise during retrial" for the 
"purpose[] of providing guidance on remand"); State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 795 
(Utah 1991) ("Issues that are fully briefed on appeal and are likely to be 
presented on remand should be addressed by this [C]ourt."). 
B. Ms. Kranendonk preserved her foregoing Jaege1"-based 
argument for appeal. 
Defendants argue that Ms. Kranendonk did not preserve the foregoing 
argument for appeal. (Br. of Cross Appellees 42-44.) Again, they are mistaken. As 
noted above, Ms. Kranendonk' s counsel argued below that a jury could draw 
from Highberg' s "moron" and "pain in the ass" comments an inference in Ms. 
Kranendonk' s favor on the issue of whether Highberg was acting to protect Ms. 
Kranendonk when he deceived her or whether he was acting out of disregard for 
her rights. (R. 8777-78, 8784.) By arguing that there was" an inference for the Jury 
to draw" in her favor (R. 8784) and that the rule 403 issue should be decided 
based on whether "the probative value outweighs the prejudice" (R. 8782), Ms. 
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Kranendonk brought to the trial court's attention the very Jaeger-based argu1nent 
she now makes on appeal-that the rule 403 issue in this case should not be 
decided based on relevancy but, rather, on an analysis of whether the "probative 
value [of Highberg's cormnents] is substantially outweighed by a danger of ... 
unfair prejudice," Utah R. Evid. 403. Hence, Ms. Kranendonk preserved her 
~ Jaeger-based argument for appeal. See Patterson v. Patterson, 2011 UT 68,112,266 
P.3d 828 (" An issue is preserved for appeal when it has been 'presented to the 
district court in such a way that the court has an opportunity to rule on [it]."' 
(alteration in original) (citation omitted)). 
{,,J!\ 
\{!)V 
In support of their preservation argument, Defendants cite Zavala v. Zavala, 
2016 UT App 6, 139,366 P.3d 422, for the proposition that "to preserve an 
appellate argument that the district court failed to properly conduct a multi-
factored legal analysis, a litigant must 'specify [the] particular factor that the 
court had failed to consider."' (Br. of Cross-Appellees 43.) But here, Ms. 
Kranendonk is not arguing that the trial court failed to properly conduct a 1nulti-
factored legal analysis; she is arguing that the trial court should have ruled 
~ Highberg's "moron" and "pain in the ass" c01nments relevant and conducted 
rule 403' s single-factored analysis (i.e., whether the probative value of a 
particular piece of evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, see Utah R. Civ. P. 403), the same argument she made below. 
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Defendants also cite 438 Main Street v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, ,r 52, 99 
P.3d 801, for the proposition that "a blanket objection to the district court's 
findings [is] insufficient to preserve for appeal the argument that the district 
judge should have 'articulate[d], in greater detail, the steps by which he reached 
his ulti1nate conclusion."' (Br. of Cross-Appellees 43.) But again, Ms. Kranendonk 
is not arguing that the trial court failed to articulate in sufficient detail the steps 
by which it reached its relevancy determination; she is arguing that it should not 
have based its rule 403 holding on a determination that Highberg' s II moron" and 
"pain in the ass" cormnents were irrelevant, an argument she made below. 
C. The trial court abused its discretion by failing to conclude 
that the probative value of Highberg' s "moron" and "pain in 
the ass" comments was not substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice. 
With regard to whether, under a proper rule 403 analysis, it was an abuse 
of discretion to exclude Highberg's "moron" and "pain in the ass" cmnments, 
Ms. Kranendonk argued in her opening brief that State v. Ruiz, 2014 UT App 143, 
329 P.3d 836, strongly suggests that it is an abuse of discretion to exclude the 
only effective rebuttal evidence to a party's self-serving testimony on a relevant 
issue. (Br. of Cross-Appellant 68-69) Defendants do not disagree.5 
s Defendants say that "a district court does not abuse its discretion by admitting 
otherwise inadmissible evidence if that evidence is necessary to rebut the 'central 
inference' of testimony presented by another litigant." (Br. of Cross-Appellees 47 
(quoting Ruiz, 2014 UT App 143, ,r 42,329 P.3d 836).) They also say that "a 
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Instead, Defendants argue that Highberg' s excluded c01mnents "were not 
necessary to rebut the 'cenh·al inference' of Mr. Highberg's testimony." (Br. of 
Cross-Appellees 49.) Specifically, they say that to rebut Highberg's testimony 
that he acted solely out of a personal solicitation that he felt for Ms. Kranendonk, 
Ms. Kranendonk should have (1) "used the remainder of the Needles notes to 
<@ suggest Mr. Highberg' s frustration" or (2) "asked [Highberg on cross-
examination] if he found Ms. Kranendonk hard to deal with and therefore might 
have had a malicious motive towards her." (Id. at 48-49.) Neither the redacted 
Needles notes nor cross-exa1nination of Highberg could have effectively rebutted 
the central inference of Highberg's testi1nony. See Ruiz, 2014 UT App 143, ,r 42, 
329 P.3d 836 (stating that" only [the challenged evidence] could have effectively 
rebutted" the "central inference" of defendant's testimony (emphasis added)). 
Nothing in the redacted Needles notes suggests that Highberg felt animus 
toward Ms. Kranendonk. (See Pl.'s Exhibit 6 at DEF0033, attached in Addendum I 
district court does not abuse its discretion when it refuses to admit otherwise 
inadmissible evidence that is unnecessary to rebut a central inference of testimony 
presented by another litigant." (Id.) But they never address Ms. Kranendonk' s 
vb assertion that it is an abuse of discretion to exclude otherwise inadmissible 
evidence when that evidence beco1nes necessary to rebut the central inference of 
another litigant's testilnony. (See id. 46-49.) 
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to Br. of Cross-Appellees.) They indicate, at most, 1nild annoyance due to the 
Kranendonks repeat inquiries regarding a trial date:6 
• "[Mr. Kranendonk] wants to know when h·ial is. I will call him back today 
to explain (again) we are years away from that. Discovery phase is just 
beginning and we don't even have all the records yet because she is not 
done treating. I may need to refer them out." (Id.) 
• "[Ms. Kranendonk] is calling constantly asking when her trial date is. I 
have told her several times we [won't] get the trial date until we certify it 
ready for trial which [won't] happen until discovery is complete." (Id.) 
Only the unredacted version of the notes is effective to rebut the inference that 
Highberg deceived Ms. Kranendonk only because he cared for her: 
• "[Mr. Kranendonk] wants to know when trial is. I will call him back today 
to explain ( again) we are years away from that. Discovery phase is just 
beginning and we don't even have all the records yet because she is not 
done treating. These people are becoming a pain in the ass. I may need to refer 
them out." (R. 5919, attached in Addendum I to Br. of Cross-Appellees.) 
• "This client is a moron. She is calling constantly asking when her trial date 
is. I have told her several times we [won't] get the trial date until we certify 
it ready for trial which [won't] happen until discovery is complete." (Id.) 
Likewise, cross-examining Highberg about his motives for deceiving Ms. 
Kranendonk without the possibility of impeaching him with his "moron" and 
"pain in the ass" cormnents would have been wholly ineffective. He simply 
could have maintained that his deceit of Ms. Kranendonk was motivated by a 
6 There are more Needles notes entries in Defendants' file for Ms. Kranendonk 
than the two quoted here. However, the vast majority of the additional entries 
(24 of 28 of them) were made by persons other than Highberg, and none of the1n 
contain anything to suggest even mild annoyance toward Ms. Kranendonk. (See 
Pl.'s Exhibit 6 at DEF0033, attached in Addendu1n I to Br. of Cross-Appellees.) 
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desire to protect her, despite feeling a 1nild am1oyance due to her "constantly 
asking when her trial date is." (Pl.'s Exhibit 6 at DEF0033, attached in Addendu1n 
I to Br. of Cross-Appellees.) 
Because Defendants tacitly concede that it is an abuse of discretion to 
exclude the only effective rebuttal evidence to a party's self-serving testimony 
~ and then fail to identify any other evidence that could have been used to 
effectively rebut the inference that Highberg was motivated only by his care for 
Ms. Kranendonk, the Court should hold that it was an abuse of discretion to 
exclude Highberg's "1noron" and "pain in the ass" comments. 
D. The trial court's errors in excluding Highberg's "moron" and 
"pain in the ass" comments were not harmless. 
Defendants argue that, in any event, the trial court's failure to conduct a 
rule 403 analysis and its exclusion of Highberg' s "moron" and u pain in the ass" 
co1nments were hannless.7 (Br. of Cross-Appellees 49-51.) 
1. The frial coU1·t' s erro1· in basing its rule 403 analysis on 
a televancy determination was not harmless. 
First, Defendants 1nake the bald assertion that if Judge Reese had done a 
proper rule 403 analysis, instead of 1naking a relevancy determination, he would 
have reached the same conclusion that Judge Himonas did prior to trial. (See Br. 
7 Ms. Kranendonk did not expressly de1nonstrate in her opening brief why the 
trial court's errors were hannful. However, "if an appellant responds in the reply 
brief to a new issue raised by the appellee in its opposing brief, the issue is not 
waived." Brown v. Glover, 2000 UT 89, ,r 24, 16 P.3d 540. 
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of Cross-Appellees 50.) However, prior to trial, Judge Hilnonas properly held 
that Highberg' s "1noron" and "pain in the ass'' connnents were relevant because 
of "the indifference and disregard" they showed toward Ms. Kranendonk' s 
rights; and, although he said that at that point their probative value was 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, he also said that 
"this is one issue that 1nay be readdressed as the evidence is developed" at trial. 
(R. 8229-30, 5389.) 
In contrast, Judge Reese did not even believe that Highberg's c01nments 
were relevant and did not even mention rule 403's standard of probative value 
being substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. (See 8776-78, 
8783-84, 8787-88.) If Judge Reese had properly applied rule 403 instead of making 
an erroneous relevancy determination, there is a reasonable likelihood that a 
different result would have been reached. Indeed, any time a judge properly 
applies the law there is a reasonable likelihood that he will reach a different 
result than if he fails to properly apply the law. Thus, Judge Reese's error in 
conducting a relevancy analysis ( or usurping the jury's role and weighing 
competing inferences) instead of conducting a proper rule 403 analysis was 
prejudicial. See Kerby v. Moab Valley Healthcare, Inc., 2015 UT App 280, ,r 24,362 
P.3d 944 (stating that an error is not harmless if" there is a reasonable likelihood 
that a different result would have been reached absent the error"). 
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2. The frial cow·t' s abuse of discretion in excluding Highberg' s 
0 mo1·on" and ''pain in the ass" comments was not ltannless. 
Finally, Defendants argue that, regardless of the analysis that led to their 
exclusion, "any error in not admitting the Needles notes in their entirety was 
equally hannless." (Br. of Cross-Appellees 50.) But the only support they offer 
for that argument is an assertion that the "the other Needles notes that had been 
admitted [and cross-examination based on the1n] could have served [the same] 
purpose" as Highberg' s redacted comments. (Id.) However, as explained above, 
~ the redacted Needles notes and any cross-examination based on them could not 
have served the same purpose as the unredacted notes. See supra pp. 19-21. The 
@ umedacted Needles notes were the only evidence that could have effectively 
rebutted Highberg's self-serving testimony that he deceived Ms. Kranendonk 
only to protect her, and exclusion of the only evidence on an essential ele1nent of 
a party's claim is always prejudicial. See, e.g., Life v. Sunbanks, Ltd., 176 Wash. 
App. 1005, 2013 WL 4501459, *5 (holding that "the trial court's improper 
exclusion of [the] only evidence [on the central issue] of actual notice was not 
harmless"); State v. Coy, 433 N.W.2d 714, 714 (Iowa 1988) (holding that exclusion 
of "the only direct evidence ... of the ele1nents of the offense" was not harmless); 
Klatt v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 211 N.E.2d 720, 727 (Ill. 1965) (holding that the 
(;i) improper exclusion of "the only evidence tending to establish willful and wanton 
misconduct ... may hardly be called harmless"). 
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CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the trial court's refusal to award Ms. 
Kranendonk her reasonable and necessary litigation expenses and remand for a 
determination of those expenses. This Court should also reverse the trial court's 
exclusion of Highberg's "moron" and "pain in the ass" co1nments; re1nand for 
retrial of her punitive damages claim; and provide guidance regarding a proper 
rule 403 analysis in this case since the issue will likely arise during retrial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED thi~ay of June 2017. 
PECK HADFIELD BAXTER & MOORE, LLC 
Brandon J. Baxter 
Matthew David Lorz 
John D. Luthy 
Attorneys for Appellee/Cross-Appellant 
Jodi Kranendonk 
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